Saturday, January 26, 2008

On Conformity

I am currently reading Why Societies Need Dissent by Cass Sunstein. This book was assigned for the Social Conflict and Criminal Justice seminar in which I am currently enrolled.1 Although I've only gotten as far as the first chapter, this is already turning out to be an interesting, and personally salient, read. Consider the following words of the author:


Conformists are often thought to be protective of social interests, keeping quiet for the sake of the group. By contrast, dissenters tend to be seen as selfish individualists, embarking on projects of their own. But in an important sense, the opposite is closer to the truth. Much of the time, dissenters benefit others, while conformists benefit themselves... Conformists are free-riders, benefiting from the actions of others without adding anything of their own.


My first thought on reading this was: HA! I am not a conformist! Why, just this week I was talking to a friend, and she said to me (I don't remember what prompted it) "Anomie, nobody in their right minds could even in passing, only seeing you only out of the corner of their eye, imagine you a conformist." //*that was a compliment...right? i'm gonna take that as a compliment*// I really don't look or act that unusual. Just different enough that I often get mistaken for an international student. Or an anthropologist2.

In stating why individuals conform, the author cites informational and reputational (i.e., normative) influences. Consider the famous triad of conformity experiments: Sherif3, Ascher4, and Milgram5. In the Sherif study, people are not sure of their answer, so they turn to others for the "truth." In Ascher, it is mixed. Some people were sure but didn't want the negative consequences of being the freak with the oddball answer. Others thought, "well, I think I'm right, but all these other people seem so sure. Perhaps they know something I don't." In the Milgram experiment, people were responding to the authority of the white coat. Likely they assumed the scientist knows something they don't.

//*in which i realize i'm a conformist*//
It was here I was reminded of my current dissertation dilemma. I was in a meeting with my mentor, who suggested a change to my survey methodology. The population I want to study is limited to a specific department within the university. I have a listserv which will automatically send an email to every student in the department. I suggested I use this to send invitations to complete my web-based survey. Though I am most interested in freshmen, it couldn't hurt to get surveys from everyone, right? Just in case I get a small n and need to improvise fast? If I ask for their grade in school, I can select just the freshman cases later if need be.

My mentor suggested that, instead of using the listserv, I seek out permission to get my hands on a list of all the freshmen emails, randomly select half of them, and just send the survey invitation to them.

I don't understand why.

But did I state my confusion? Ask for clarification? Assert my original idea?

NO.

I conformed. I pushed the button. YES, I would have fried the poor research subject.

But only because I wouldn't be frying myself. I wonder how the Milgram experiment would play out if you were hurting yourself? I say this because Sunstein also points out something important about conformity: it is influenced by outside factors. When the question is easy (are these lines the same length?), people will dissent if they are being rewarded for correct answers ($). When the question is hard, people will conform if they are rewarded for correct answers. We conform when it suits us, dissent when there's perceived benefit. It's very rational-choice, no?

Sunstein argues that this is because conformity in easy questions is rooted in reputational/normative motives, whereas conformity in hard questions is motivated by informational ones. In other words, we are more likely to agree with the crowd when we don't know what else to do or think. The Milgram experiment adds the element of informational power, in that we might feel certain, but we also feel like the scientist is smarter than us. So we question.

This is what I am dealing with. I feel confident, but someone smarter than me seems certain of another answer. But my dissertation is on the line. So, I kept quiet, but only in the meeting. Then I asked another professor, who emailed the directer of a survey lab, who backs me up (strength of weak ties in action; yay, Granovetter!). Still, I turned to informational authority to solve my dilemma.

But really - why would I sample when it would require MORE work, and the financial cost is the same? Wouldn't my response rate be the same regardless, in which case sampling would diminish my n?

I am anxiously awaiting my copy of Dillman's 2007 book on survey design. Irritated, however, that there isn't some sort of upgrade program. I have the 2000 edition, after all!


1I enrolled in this class because it is only vaguely interesting to me. As such, I assumed I would not get sucked into the readings, and would therefore have plenty of time to work on more important stuff (dissertation proposal, PhD candidate exams, oral defense, etc). I was wrong. Against my best efforts, I am engrossed.
2My first year at my PhD school, there wasn't enough office space for all the sociologists, so they had to assign someone to be in the anthropology office. They chose me, because I looked like an anthropology student. One of our office staff members spent the entire first year thinking I was anth.
3Light shines. Looks like it is moving, but it isn't. Alone, people's guess as to how much it moves is all over the map. In groups, answers converge.
4Match lines with same length. Alone, people answer correctly. In a room full of confederates all answering confidently - but incorrectly - people agree with confederates.
5Test hidden subject. If subject wrong, shock. Scientists tells individual to incrementally increase shock. People comply. Often fake subject gets deadly electrocution.

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